Frame draws heavily from Leithart’s essay on medieval philosophy. It is a standard treatment in many ways, starting with Boethius and ending with the nominalists.
Since we are temporal, this means we lose some of our being as time passes. Not so with God (124). Boethius takes the chain of being ontology and applies it to time.
His definition of person is problematic: A person is an individual substance of a rational nature. As Frame says, “If each person is a substance, then the whole Trinity is one substance and three substances” (125).
Standard summary of his arguments. Tries to make him a presuppositionalist. The best we can say is that Anselm presupposes the dogma of the church. Within that he can use reason and not Scripture.
Towards Scholasticism: Avicenna, Maimonides, Averoes
Heavy influence of neo-Platonism. Creation is seen as an eternal act of God, not an event in the beginning of time (141).
Standard treatment. Quite fair to him. Frame has a fascinating footnote on p.150. Many traditional theologians say we can know the “who” of God, but not his essence. Greek theologians denied we could know the essence because in Greek philosophy knowing was a form of dominating. Absolute knowledge erases differance. One who has the concept of “a thing” has the thing. Concept is domination. Knowledge is knowledge only insofar as it “seizes” the thing and has complete certainty.
It is not surprising, then, that Christian theologians say we can’t know God’s essence. We certainly cannot bring God under our domination as a thing. But this raises a problem: why is Christian discourse obligated to define knowledge this way?
Let’s completely disregard the above def. of knowledge. Why not rather say with the better moments of the tradition that knowing presupposes–at least in some cases–a loving bond between subject and object?